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I
Interdisciplinary social science fields such as Law and Society, American Political
Development, and historical sociology have paid comparatively little attention to
the question of  how the repression of  movements for social democracy may
have shaped the expansion of  U.S. government power over the 20th century.
Questions of  how the U.S. state has been “shaped by war and trade,” or how
social history and political history can converge by “bringing the state back in,”
do not tend to treat military and law enforcement agencies as shaping the
“opportunity structure” of  social movements.1
Similarly, studies of  social movements in the U.S. may touch upon
issues of  government repression, but the issue remains largely under-theorized,
especially across different social movements. It is commonplace to note the
“exceptionally hostile terrain” for labor unions and third parties in U.S. history.2
And the history of  anti-communism in the U.S. is fairly extensive. But the nature
and historic effects of  government repression of  nearly all movements for social
democracy in the 20th century U.S., especially since the 1950s, remains a topic
that has so far interested activists more than academics.
Part of  the problem is archival rather than theoretical. More than four
decades after the passage of  open government laws, most of  the archives pro-
duced by U.S. government intelligence operations in the 20th century have either
been destroyed, secretly transferred to private hands, or kept classified. 
The U.S. government’s systematic destruction and withholding of  docu-
ments related to its intelligence programs has produced a massive historical and
cultural erasure in both academic and popular U.S. history. Without the records
of  government agencies that defined as one of  their missions the repression of
communism during the short 20th century (1914-1991), it is impossible to fully
analyze the role of  government repression in shaping U.S. political culture during
the 20th century.3
The inability to know the full extent of  U.S. government surveillance
decades after the fact has done more than produce a culture of  impunity within
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U.S. government. It also contributes to a political culture that has accommodated
an explosion of  domestic surveillance practices by governments and corpora-
tions over the past decade. As Frank Donner wrote thirty years ago in The Age of
Surveillance, surveillance has always been a “mode of  governance.”4 But since
September 11, 2001, it has also become the dominant mode of  law enforcement
in the United States, with a breadth and depth that would have been unimagin-
able before the digital revolution. 
We can only speculate about what effects this massive surveillance sys-
tem has had or will have on the political culture of  the U.S. But one important
way to understand its significance is to chip away at the myopia that sustains it:
to unearth the long history of  the U.S. government intelligence programs that
have always targeted movements for social democracy in the name of  national
security. To do that, however, we first need access to the archives.
II
The walls erected by the U.S. government to historical reckoning are not total.
They do require a great deal of  effort to surmount, however— effort that most
historians are not inclined to make, and are generally not trained to do in gradu-
ate school. 
And so it comes as welcome news that three works on U.S. government
repression, all of  them drawn heavily from Department of  Justice and FBI
records obtained through Freedom of  Information Act (FOIA) requests and liti-
gation, have been published in the last three years. Each of  these books charts
important new ground, but in different ways.
Robert Justin Goldstein’s American Blacklist provides the first sustained
scholarly attention to the creation and enforcement of  the Attorney General’s
List of  Subversive Organizations (AGLOSO) in nearly 45 years. Ivan
Greenberg’s The Dangers of  Dissent provides one of  the only historical surveys of
FBI political spying after the death of  its longtime Director, J. Edgar Hoover, in
1972. And Tim Wiener’s Enemies details the inner workings of  the FBI’s leader-
ship—particularly since the 1960s— perhaps better than any other work to date.
Reviewing these books together provides an opportunity to assess not
just the history of  government repression of  movements for social democracy,
but the challenges of  doing historical research by “liberating information” from
classified government archives, as Greenberg calls it.
III
In American Blacklist, Robert Goldstein describes the role that the U.S.
Department of  Justice played in using the ideology of  national security to under-
mine the politics of  social democracy during the early years of  the Cold War.
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From 1947 to 1955, the Attorney General’s List of  Subversive Organizations
(AGLOSO) popularized the notion that many left-wing organizations were
“communist fronts” regardless of  the actual influence that the Communist Party
had in them.
American Blacklist expertly traces AGLOSO’s origins to a “secretly creat-
ed 1940-1941 government listing of  organizations in which membership alone
would raise doubts about suitability for federal employment” (17). It then
explains how, following the massive strike wave of  1946, and the election of  a
conservative, anti-labor Congress, President Truman succumbed to political pres-
sure by issuing Executive Order 9835. EO 9835 prohibited communists from
employment in federal government or, crucially, from being recipients of  federal
government funds. It directed the Attorney General to create a list of  “subver-
sive organizations” to enforce the order—which it did by reviving the list it pro-
duced during World War II.
Truman lost control over the enforcement of  his own Order, however,
when Congress pressured him to place the FBI in charge of  its enforcement.
According to Goldstein, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover interpreted his new man-
date broadly, and it served “for the next thirty years as a key basis for [the FBI’s]
increasingly virtually unbounded investigation of  individuals and groups
throughout American society, including the widespread use of  a variety of  illegal
burglaries, wiretaps, and other intrusive means” (52).
According to Goldstein, “although it is impossible to disentangle the
impact of  AGLOSO from that of  other repressive governmental measures dur-
ing the Red Scare,” he still argues that AGLOSO was the “single most important
domestic factor that fostered and facilitated the [second] Red Scare” (xi). This is
a bit of  hyperbole. Greenberg ignores the effect of  such other legal instruments
at the FBI’s disposal such as the Smith Act, the Taft-Hartley Act, and later the
McCarran Act in criminalizing membership in the communist party and “com-
munist fronts” over the course of  the 1940s and early 1950s in the United States. 
Yet still Greenberg makes a strong case that AGLOSO’s importance
has heretofore been understated, and he connects its omission from most histo-
ries of  the Cold War by describing the erasure of  its archive from the public
domain. “The heart of  this book,” he explains, “is based on research in archival
materials or materials obtained through the Freedom of  Information Act
(FOIA) that have rarely, if  ever, been accessed by researchers” (349). Only
through recently released FBI and Department of  Justice files was he able to
chart AGLOSO’s effects. “The vast majority of  the approximately 280
AGLOSO-designated organizations were extremely obscure and have left barely
a trace of  their existence anywhere, except perhaps in the FBI files. However,
substantial secondary studies exist for about 30 of  the most prominent of  these
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groups” (350). As a result, government documents provide a basis to not just
study government repression, but to recover part of  the history of  those move-
ments that government agencies sought to suppress. 
Rather than offering a history of  AGLOSO from the perspective of
those who participated in the organizations listed as “subversive,” however,
American Blacklist uses FBI files mainly to track the political history of  AGLOSO,
with an emphasis on administrative rule-making and subsequent court chal-
lenges. By tracing AGLOSO’s evolution, American Blacklist shows how the listing
of  “communist fronts” for the purpose of  denying people employment was a
political project constantly in crisis because it criminalized what was later deter-
mined to be constitutionally protected rights to “free speech.” Those organiza-
tions that survived being listed on AGLOSO were thus able to mount legal chal-
lenges that subjected AGLOSO to legal scrutiny, through which the list was ulti-
mately ruled unconstitutional.  
Though the Attorney General ceased adding organizations to
AGLOSO in the mid-1950s once the Supreme Court constrained some of  the
excesses of  the second Red Scare, the damage had already been done. Within a
little over fifteen years, only 20 of  the 274 organizations originally listed survived
(66). AGLOSO’s public listing of  nearly 300 “subversive” organizations (many
of  them created during the late 1930s when liberals, socialists, and communists
worked in coalition with each other in a “popular front” against fascism) did
more than merely blur the boundaries between Communist Party members and
those whom they may have worked with. It provided a legal basis for the FBI to
investigate hundreds of  thousands of  individuals for supposed communist sym-
pathies, for thousands of  people to be denied careers in their chosen profes-
sions, and for the disassembling or purging of  most left-wing institutions. 
American Blacklist is the definitive work to date on AGLOSO, and an
essential reference work on Cold War government repression. But it offers a
dense political and legal history in a narrative populated more with federal
agency acronyms than individuals. It ends by tracing AGLOSO’S afterlife in a lit-
tle-known attempt by President Nixon’s administration to unsuccessfully revive
the blacklist, providing a fascinating but in some ways anti-climactic ending that
avoids tracing the cultural afterlife of  public policy. 
Because it bred suspicion that any number of  reform activities might
be “fronts” for “subversives,” Greenberg argues that AGLOSO “played a central
role in molding an entire cohort of  Americans (known as ‘the silent generation’
on college campuses) who feared to join organizations, sign petitions, or other-
wise express their views” (xiv). This is likely true, but such a claim needs closer
attention to the culture of  the Cold War to substantiate. What American Blacklist
could develop more fully is the concept of  the blacklist as a cultural process for
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disenfranchising people in the name of  democracy rather than just a mere list
controlled by the Department of  Justice. After all, the list modeled a process for
determining eligibility for employment copied by local and state governments
and private employers. This marked the blacklist as a form of  governmentality,
and not just a legal mechanism. As the term blacklist became a verb and not just
a noun, its adoption normalized firing people for their political beliefs. It is that
process of  normalization— which raises all sorts of  questions about the rela-
tionship between citizenship and employment— that American Blacklist takes for
granted, by describing them as the mere effect of  a list maintained by the
Department of  Justice.
IV
Ivan Greenberg’s The Dangers of  Dissent promises a different approach to using
government documents to narrate the history of  surveillance programs. He
describes his research on post-1965 (and especially post-1972) FBI domestic
intelligence programs as “bottom up” history: “rather than focus on top leaders,
I hope to shift the ground to subjects” (8). 
This is an admirable intention, but it does not accurately describe the
book. The main sources for the book are government documents about left-
wing social movements, not documents produced or assembled by activists
themselves. To the degree that the subjects of  surveillance appear at all, it is
mainly as litigants seeking to uncover the spying that targeted them rather than
as activists with a broader agenda. As a result, The Dangers of  Dissent ends up
being largely a history of  FBI surveillance, not a history of  those under surveil-
lance. 
According to Greenberg, “declassified FBI spy files form the primary
research of  this book.” He assembled these files through “ninety five FOIA
requests with the FBI and obtained approximately forty-five declassified files
constituting about thirty-five thousand pages,” with a few thousand of  those
pages requiring a lawsuit to release. Greenberg calls this method of  research “lib-
erating information” through “FOIA activism” (9).
But as Greenberg himself  confesses, despite his activist language, his
method produced less information about social movements than about the FBI.
Or, as he states in his introduction, “I did not find many ‘smoking guns’—that
is, FBI memos that reveal big, unknown state secrets. Rather, the declassified
material revealed patterns of  government behavior” (13). And so The Dangers of
Dissent ends up being more a history of  how the FBI has been able to sustain its
domestic intelligence operations in both legal and illegal ways, and less about the
nature of  government surveillance programs or their effects on U.S. political cul-
ture.
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The Dangers of  Dissent begins by going over largely well-known illegal
activities by the FBI in the late 1960s and early 1970s under its counterintelli-
gence programs (COINTELPRO) against black nationalists and New Left
activists: illegal break-ins; illegal wiretaps; encouraging activists to fight and even
kill each other; planting false stories in the news media; writing fake letters to
politicians, media, and to activists, etc. From this perspective, Greenberg intro-
duces the problem of  what he calls “state crimes” committed by the FBI with
impunity.
The Dangers of  Dissent is most valuable when it leaves the well-worn
track of  COINTELPRO history and provides a narrative of  succeeding FBI
intelligence programs under different presidents— from the attempted reforms
of  Presidents Ford and Carter, to the reactivation of  widespread domestic intelli-
gence programs by President Reagan two decades before the War on Terror.
This is largely uncharted historical territory. It is made possible by Greenberg’s
acquisition of  files on FBI directors during the 1970s, and by his tracking a vari-
ety of  lawsuits from the 1980s to the present.
The gist of  the arc that Greenberg traces is a “dramatic withdrawal” of
politically-motivated investigations of  social movement activists during the late
1970s, followed by a speedy restoration and even expansion of  domestic spying
initiated by President Reagan and continuing unabated ever since (115).
Greenberg thus tracks a shift in Cold War era domestic intelligence practices
from the politics of  anti-subversion to the politics of  anti-terrorism. 
The 1970s were the heyday of  Congressional investigations into, and
wide-ranging litigation against, illegal FBI activities. According to Greenberg,
during this time the FBI’s intelligence apparatus went through an intense reprior-
itization of  its work: “Compared to 21,414 active investigations in 1973, the FBI
conducted only 4,868 investigations in 1976, a decline of  more than 400 per-
cent…. By 1978, the FBI claimed only 102 investigations were conducted
nationwide” (115-16). Reflecting this shift, the number of  FBI special agents
declined 10 percent during the late 1970s (107). This was an extraordinary trans-
formation.  
But Greenberg notes that during the 1970s, the FBI also re-legitimized
its domestic spying in ways that paved the way for the Reagan restoration by
shifting its work from policing “subversion” to policing “terrorism.” FBI domes-
tic intelligence did not end, even if  the figure of  the terrorist seemed to suggest
a more criminal and thus more legitimate object of  scrutiny than the more
amorphous Cold War figure of  the “agitator,” “rabble rouser,” or “subversive.”
Instead, the FBI’s domestic intelligence became more focused on self-proclaimed
revolutionary organizations like the Weather Underground and various factions
of  the new communist movement, and on organization leaders rather than rank-
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and-file members. Even though the FBI ceased its surveillance of  the white
nationalist National Alliance during this time, it maintained its surveillance of  the
Communist Party and even the Socialist Workers Party (116).  
Greenberg provides a speculative explanation for the decline of  FBI
investigations of  activists over the course of  the 1970s: a shift in targets from
activists to politicians.  One of  the FBI’s primary activities in the 1970s involved
its campaign to prosecute politicians for corruption by using federal agents to
snare them in elaborate bribery schemes that bordered on entrapment. “By the
end of  1978,” Greenberg claims, “the FBI conducted about one thousand public
corruption cases focused on crimes by congressmen, governors, state legislators,
and police chiefs” (105). 
In ABSCAM, the FBI’s most famous program for investigating political
corruption, undercover agents posed as representatives of  the fictitious “Abdul
Enterprises” and offered bribes to unsuspecting elected officials. The FBI’s use
of  the specter of  the dangerous Arab corrupting American democracy dove-
tailed with the FBI’s reinvention of  itself  as an agency to fight terrorism. At a
time when the exposure of  FBI misdeeds under Hoover embarrassed the organi-
zation, Goldberg argues, “the FBI wanted to punish Congress for exposing [the
FBI’s] past corruption.” In this way, Greenberg claims that ABSCAM served as a
form of  political “payback” (106). Greenberg also mentions in passing that as
the FBI’s investigations into political corruption evolved, they disproportionately
targeted and ensnared black politicians elected after the passage of  the Voting
Rights Act and the growth of  the black mayors’ movement (133-34).  
But in both the case of  ABSCAM and the FBI’s targeting of  black
politicians, I am not aware of  any evidence that proves that the FBI’s investiga-
tions were motivated by political payback for Congressional investigations into
FBI misdeeds. As proof  of  a political vendetta, Greenberg cites only a single
quote, in which FBI Director William Webster (later CIA Director and now
Chairman of  the Homeland Security Advisory Council) told an American Bar
Association meeting that “in the FBI we’ve been under attack for past incidents
and circumstances,” and also described Congressional backlash to ABSCAM as
“similar to the emotions in the Bureau when they had their times” (106). But this
quote seems more suggestive, and not enough to rest such a serious accusation
of  malfeasance. The agency’s malicious intent is plausible, but much more schol-
arly investigation seems necessary before such claims can have credibility.   
Even if  the FBI shifted its attention from activists to politicians, how-
ever, it did not do so for long. During the 1980s, Greenberg documents, “Reagan
ushered in a new era of  surveillance by broadly linking domestic dissent to ter-
rorism, falsely associating violence with peaceful and lawful protest” (143). After
reaching an historic low in the late 1970s, the FBI conducted as many as 20,000
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investigations into international terrorism between 1982 and 1988 (138). As part
of  this expansion, the FBI in the 1980s systematically targeted anti-nuclear
activists and environmentalists who used direct-action, and, importantly, immi-
grant groups and Arab-American organizations critical of  Israel (120). 
As the Iran-Contra scandal broke in the late 1980s, so did the story that
the FBI had engaged in a widespread, systematic program of  infiltration and dis-
ruption of  the Committee In Solidarity with the People of  El Salvador (CIS-
PES), and likely also was engaged in a series of  break-ins in liberal churches that
provided sanctuary to refugees from the wars in Central America.5 The FBI
transferred what it claims to be the entirety of  those files to the National
Archives as part of  litigation brought against it, but it is my understanding that
the vast majority of  that archive remains classified over two decades later. 
With the end of  the Cold War came the opportunity to challenge the
legitimacy of  the FBI’s domestic intelligence programs, but that opportunity was
short lived. As an outgrowth of  probes of  FBI spying on opponents of  the
Reagan administration’s Central America policies, Congress forbade the FBI
from conducting investigations of  American citizens based on their speech in
1992. But this law, known as the Edwards Amendment, was short-lived. It was
repealed in 1996 in the wake of  the 1993 World Trade Center bombing,
Republican Party electoral victories during the 1994 mid-term elections, and
1995 Oklahoma City bombing (162). 
Following these events, the chance for post-Cold War elimination or
reform of  domestic intelligence practices was lost.  As Greenberg notes,
“President Clinton presided over one of  the largest expansions of  the FBI in
U.S. history…. A 1990 budget of  about $1.7 billion reached $3.1 billion in 1999”
(163). By the late 1990s, half  of  that budget went to investigative activities, and
one third of  the FBI’s entire workforce was located in its National Security
Division. The FBI was unlikely to be sued for these investigations— not just
because information about them is scarce, but because anti-terrorism laws passed
in the 1980s and 1990s made such investigations legal and secret (275). In this
way, the War on Terror began before September 11, 2001. It just hadn’t been
consolidated into new information-sharing networks and digital surveillance
practices yet. 
The concluding chapters of  The Dangers of  Dissent document the history
of  obscure and largely failed attempts to use public records law to provide a
check on illegal government spying.  The passage of  a law in 1986 providing
exemptions for “foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, or international terror-
ism” from the Freedom of  Information Act has provided wide latitude to feder-
al agencies to withhold or redact most intelligence domestic documents pro-
duced since the 1970s (216). Indeed, federal agencies frequently “blackball” or
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refuse to even acknowledge the existence of  files that they unilaterally consider
outside the realm of  open government laws.6
That the national security state has developed wide exemptions for
itself  in public disclosure law, and developed a series of  professional practices
for interpreting those exemptions to its benefit, is perhaps no surprise. But that
this transformation took place as part of  the development of  an anti-terrorist
framework for domestic law enforcement is still noteworthy. The Dangers of
Dissent tracks this administrative transformation in state capacity well, but does
not analyze it very thoroughly. And because barriers to public disclosure are now
so high, the book’s description of  the FBI’s domestic political intelligence opera-
tions is mainly useful for bringing together different stories, rather than adding
new information about domestic spying practices. Whether and to what degree
FBI surveillance activities had a substantial effect on the social movements they
sought to neutralize, or the political culture of  the last few decades, remains a
topic still in need of  greater exploration.
V
Whereas Robert Goldstein and Ivan Greenberg put years of  effort into acquiring
the government documents that they wrote about in their books, Tim Weiner
more or less had the never-before-seen files that he used for his book Enemies
dropped in his lap. Such are the rewards of  being a prominent reporter for the
New York Times on national security issues.
The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) acquired tens of  thousands
of  pages of  files via FOIA on the FBI’s domestic intelligence activities, and then
turned them over to Weiner after the publication of  his book Legacy of  Ashes: The
History of  the CIA. Weiner also benefited from the FBI’s publication of  previous-
ly released files on its web site, along with a substantial collection of  oral histo-
ries collected and published online by the Society of  Former Agents of  the FBI.
And finally, the release in 2011 of  FBI files on “Operation SOLO”—the infiltra-
tion of  the leadership of  the Communist Party by Morris and Jack Childs—
timed perfectly with Weiner’s own writing of  his book. Based on this research
largely done by others, Weiner produced a well-written account of  the how the
FBI’s extensive apparatus for monitoring the activities of  U.S. citizens has failed
time and again to apprehend spies and terrorists within the U.S. government and
society.
This is a story that—while not based in the specific archives that
Weiner had access to— has been told before, most notably by Athan Theoharis
in his book Chasing Spies: How the FBI Failed in Counterintelligence but Promoted the
Politics of  McCarthyism in the Cold War Years.7 So it is to Weiner’s discredit that he
does not cite any of  the work Theoharis has produced in his long and distin-
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guished career. Indeed, Weiner does not cite any sources at all for the informa-
tion he provides in Enemies— he only provides citations for quotes. And when
he cites FBI files, he merely notes “FBI/ FOIA,” and does not cite the file
name, number, or serial of  the documents he used. This not only makes it diffi-
cult for other historians to verify his sources, it suggests that Weiner might not
be familiar with the FBI’s file system—something that is more or less required of
those who use FOIA to recover archives from the FBI.
These differences in citation methods between journalists and histori-
ans are more than mere trifles, because where Enemies is weakest is in its failure
to engage with the voluminous literature on the FBI’s domestic intelligence pro-
grams during the Hoover era. Weiner’s account of  Cold War era surveillance
under Hoover is a top-down, inside story. As such, it spends most of  its atten-
tion on recounting how the FBI was able to infiltrate the Communist Party at
the very top, and produce a ream of  invaluable intelligence in the process.
Weiner thus mainly documents whether and to what degree the FBI apprehend-
ed communist spies in the 1940s and 1950s. Lost in this history is the fact that,
as Robert Goldstein helps document, the FBI played a key role in systematically
disassembling the institutions of  the left in the U.S. under the auspices of  anti-
communism.  
Just as troubling is Weiner’s use of  FBI spy files to rationalize the FBI’s
intelligence and counter-intelligence programs against the black freedom move-
ment during the Cold War. Weiner claims that files from the FBI agent Morris
Childs “help explain several mysteries of  the Cold War, including Hoover’s fero-
cious opposition to Martin Luther King, Jr., and the civil rights movement…”
(208). 
Weiner’s analysis shows an extraordinary lack of  engagement with the
substantial literature on the FBI’s history of  targeting African Americans with
intelligence and counterintelligence programs. He does not take into account or
explain FBI targeting of  black radicals during and after World War I—so well
documented by Theodore Kornweibel, Jr.8 He does not mention the role of  the
FBI in the deportation of  Marcus Garvey. He does not seem to be familiar with
Robert Hill’s book, RACON: Racial Conditions in the United States During World War
II which published thousands of  pages of  FBI intelligence on black nationalists
and activists in the early years of  the modern civil rights movement.9 Nor does
he make any reference to the FBI’s file on “Foreign Inspired Agitation Among
American Negroes”— through which the FBI collected over 140,000 pages of
files on the black freedom movement between 1941 and 1957, and repressed the
black labor-left, years before it opened a file on Martin Luther King, Jr. 
Instead of  citing this historical record, Weiner cites a few exchanges
between Morris Childs and Soviet leaders in the late 1950s to deduce that
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Hoover’s fierce hatred for Martin Luther King, Jr. was based on understandable
national security concerns about communist infiltration of  the civil rights move-
ment. It is true that the FBI had evidence that Stanley Levison, a close adviser to
King, had deep ties to the Communist Party— ties that he never revealed to
King or the general public.10 But Weiner presents this information as if  the FBI
might not have otherwise monitored King at all, as if  it didn’t already have the
entire black freedom movement under investigation for “communist infiltration.”
Weiner thus concluded to National Public Radio personality Terry Gross that
Hoover “had a reason, beyond racism” for investigating Martin Luther King, Jr.,
“that he wasn't a monster. What he did was understandable in the context of  the
times.”11 Congressional investigations in the 1970s would suggest that is an his-
torical assessment even people at the time would have likely disagreed with.  
Because Tim Weiner’s books receive greater publicity than almost all
other scholarly monographs put together, his omissions in Enemies have signifi-
cant cultural effects.  His writing on the FBI before the 1970s has in some ways
displaced and undermined decades of  important and less-well-known scholar-
ship—scholarship that is less exclusively based on FBI files, and is much more
critical of  Hoover and the FBI. 
Yet Enemies is still valuable. It contains, I believe, the single best history
of  the war between the Nixon White House and the FBI over control of
domestic intelligence operations in the U.S. during the early 1970s— a war that
brought down both institutions in the Watergate scandal and its immediate after-
math. No other book that I am aware of  documents so effectively how President
Nixon’s attempt to remove control of  domestic intelligence operations from J.
Edgar Hoover, and internal struggles within the FBI’s leadership over how to
respond to Nixon, produced a series of  fights that escalated into a kind of
mutually assured destruction for both the White House and the FBI.  
When the Nixon White House developed its own domestic intelligence
operation, it also usurped the traditional prerogatives of  the FBI, despite the
objection of  Hoover and his loyalists. Weiner pays particular attention to the key
but often overlooked role of  Hoover’s Director of  Domestic Intelligence,
William Sullivan, in supporting the White House against Hoover and precipitat-
ing some of  the conflict between the two. Hoover loyalists in the FBI, including
but not limited to Mark Felt, then leaked information about the White House
operation to the Washington Post. But exposing corruption in the White House
raised the broader issue of  U.S. government corruption.  In the wake of  the
Watergate scandal, the U.S. Senate conducted a series of  hearings and produced
multi-volume reports on FBI misdeeds that have left the agency’s reputation tar-
nished ever since.
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The wave of  releases of  scandalous information about both the FBI
and the Nixon White House revealed more about the U.S. national security state
during the Cold War than had ever been previously revealed, and permanently
damaged the legitimacy and public trust of  government in U.S. political culture.
The FBI’s attempts to personally destroy Dr. King, and to use counter-intelli-
gence programs (COINTELPRO) to “neutralize” black radicals in order to pre-
vent “the rise of  a black messiah,” made “COINTELPRO” a household word
for illegal and immoral government operations against its own citizens. 
After documenting the immediate aftermath of  the Watergate scandal,
Enemies provides a look at the troubled inside of  the FBI as an organization dur-
ing the 1980s and 1990s. Weiner describes the FBI’s repeated failures to prevent
terrorist attacks, its unproductive turf-battles with the CIA, its leadership strug-
gles, its infiltration by Soviet agents, and the uneven record of  its various
Directors. No mention is made of  the FBI’s extraordinary deployment of
resources against non-violent environmental activists, so-called “eco-terrorists,”
as documented in William Potter’s Green is the New Red.12 But on the other hand,
the repeated stories of  intelligence failures provide a picture of  a troubled insti-
tution— one that Weiner uses to implicitly question whether the FBI should be
trusted with the vast powers that it has been given by Congress under the War
on Terror.
VI
If  police, FBI, military, CIA, and National Security Agency records were proper-
ly preserved and open to the public, historians would be expected as a matter of
course to explore the archives as part of  their research on just about any topic
related to 20th century United States political and cultural history. Learning how
to navigate government intelligence program records would be part of  many
PhD students’ training, and part of  the broader experience of  doing research in
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) collections. Those
records could be read against the grain to provide histories of  all sorts of  organ-
izations, individuals, and social formations whose archival traces have otherwise
been lost. And the extraordinary volume and elaborate methods of  government
intelligence practices would have to be taken into account in just about any his-
tory of  the growth of  the state over the course of  the 20th century.
Lacking public access to already-declassified archives, historians must
become more aggressive in learning how to request that files be declassified and
released to the public. Here are some places to start.
Substantial portions of  police department domestic intelligence “red
squad” files from New York City and Portland are open to the public but remain
underutilized. A substantial quantity of  Chicago red squad files have only just
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been opened to the public this year, and deserve historians’ attention. 
FBI files are now more accessible than ever before. The National
Archives recently acquired a vast array of  files on social movements from the
1940s through the 1960s, many of  which are listed in its Archival Research
Catalog (ARC) online. Researchers still have to file FOIA requests to get the files
declassified, however.
The FBI also has a substantial number of  historically significant files,
which are now more easily accessible because they can be released as pdf  files on
CD-ROM and because the Obama administration requires that all FOIA
requests be processed with a “presumption in favor of  disclosure.”  Perhaps
some of  the most historically significant files still in the FBI’s possession relate
to what it calls “foreign counterintelligence.” These are “105” series files that
cover both nationalistic tendencies in U.S. social movements (Black, Latino/a,
Asian, and Native American), as well as U.S. government tracking of  revolution-
aries (especially communist ones) from other countries when they travel to the
U.S. or develop ties to activists in the U.S. This vast collection includes files on
everything from the Nation of  Islam to Cuban communists and Puerto Rican
Independence activists, few of  which have ever been released to the public.
For historians to take seriously the question of  government repression
in their cultural and political histories, they are going to have to learn how to
gain access to these kinds of  collections. Otherwise they will accommodate the
government’s desire to shape the course of  history without leaving a trace. 
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